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Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion:
A Rule of Reason Approach
Despite its apparent clarity, the "per se" rule against price fixing' has
given rise to a great deal of confusion and inconsistency in antitrust law.
At times, practices have been brought within the rule's scope merely be-
cause they touch upon price in some way, while at other times the eco-
nomic consequences of the situation have been considered. The erratic ap-
plication of the rule stems from a basic discrepancy between the legal and
economic treatments of "price fixing." Analysis reveals that the courts
have developed neither a clear economic definition of price fixing nor co-
herent criteria for applying the per se rule.
Furthermore, the per se rule has been used to strike down economically
efficient behavior.2 The courts have proscribed cooperative activities on the
grounds that there was some agreement as to price, even though there
were potential efficiency gains similar to those available from arrange-
ments generally evaluated under a "rule of reason" standard, such as joint
ventures and partnerships. A rule of reason approach to price fixing can
preserve most of the advantages of a per se rule while promoting more of
the gains from efficient activities and bringing greater consistency to the
law. This Note argues that the courts should therefore adopt a rule of
reason approach to price fixing.
I. Rationales for a Per Se Approach to Price Fixing
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations."' This lan-
guage was originally interpreted literally to forbid every combination in
1. "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (Madison Oil).
As will be shown, neither a purpose to fix prices nor actual success in doing so is necessary for
liability under the Madison Oil rule; rather, "[a]ny combination which tampers with price structures
is engaged in an unlawful activity." Id. at 221; see infra note 42.
2. Economically efficient behavior is behavior that increases the aggregate wealth of society. This
may occur either by lowering production costs (productive efficiency) or by assigning goods or services
to more highly valued uses (allocative efficiency). The two forms of efficiency are closely related, since
a firm that produces more efficiently will drive less efficient competitors from the market, thereby
freeing the latter's resources for more highly valued uses. See F. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 9 (1933). The terms "productive efficiency" and "allocative efficiency" are explained more fully
in R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 90-106 (1978); see also
Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. PROC. 105 (1969)
(proposing allocative efficiency as criterion for shaping antitrust policy).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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restraint of trade,4 but this literal reading of the Act was soon qualified to
recognize the validity of agreements that had no direct and immediate ef-
fect on interstate commerce5 and of restraints ancillary to agreements oth-
erwise economically beneficial.' This broader approach to the Sherman
Act has been incorporated in a rule of reason standard often adopted
when the practice in question does not involve an explicit specification of
price. The Supreme Court first explicitly announced the rule of reason in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States" and elaborated the concept in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States.8 According to the rule of reason ap-
proach of Chicago Board of Trade, liability under section 1 requires not
only an agreement to restrain trade but also a showing of actual or proba-
4. "When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in
restraint of trade. . . the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of
contract alone which is an unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such
language. . . ." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897) (Peckham,
J.). Justice Peckham was anxious to avoid an interpretation of the Sherman Act as merely adopting
the common law distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade. The common
law allowed cartels to defend themselves by arguing that the prices they charged were reasonable;
Justice Peckham, however, thought it was impossible for courts to decide upon a "reasonable" price.
Id. at 331.
5. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898) (Peckham, J.) (upholding agreement to set
commissions by members of livestock exchange because it had no direct effect on interstate commerce).
Justice Peckham also applied the "direct and immediate effect" test in United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898), which struck down a railroad cartel similar to the one in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897) (Peckham, J.).
6. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.)
("[C]ontract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade
is merely ancillary."), modified and afi'd, 175 U.S. 211, 244 (1899) (agreement must be upheld if its
effects upon interstate commerce "were only indirect and incidental," and if "it was executed for
another and entirely different purpose"). Judge Taft's decision used the common law notion of ancil-
lary restraints to interpret the Sherman Act, 85 F. at 280-91; Justice Peckham achieved the same
result by applying the "direct and immediate effect" test. 175 U.S. at 243-45.
7. "The statute . . . evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts
. . . which did not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from
being restrained by methods. . . which would constitute an interference, that is, an undue restraint."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (White, J.). Justice White's formulation of
the rule of reason in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) is also a
useful one: "[T]he words 'restraint of trade' . . . only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or
combinations . . . which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident
purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade . .. ."
8. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business. . .; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
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ble invidious effects.' By contrast, the adoption of a per se rule for price
fixing10 was based on the Court's view that the effects of price fixing are
so invariably injurious that no inquiry into them is required-merely en-
gaging in the proscribed conduct by agreeing to fix prices is a sufficient
basis for liability.11 This per se approach has been applied in other areas.
Boycotts,12 horizontal market division," "tying" arrangements,"' and re-
sale price maintenance1 5 are now subject to a per se rule.16
A per se rule can offer certain advantages. Before developing the argu-
ment for a rule of reason approach to price fixing, therefore, the Note sets
out the rationales for a per se rule. Three justifications for a per se ap-
proach to price fixing have been advanced: economic reliability,17 ease of
judicial administration,"' and predictability for law and business. 1 '
9. Under that approach, intent is not by itself a basis for liability; rather, intent may be used "to
interpret facts and to predict consequences." Id.
10. The complete break with the rule of reason approach was first dearly made in United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Madison Oil). See infra pp. 712-14.
11. "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on com-
petition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
12. See, e.g., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott of retailer by
10 national appliance manufacturers per se illegal); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (boycott by dress manufacturers of retailers who sold "pirated" designs per se
illegal).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Topeo Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (territorial restrictions
imposed in connection with joint venture to market private-label grocery products per se illegal);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (assignment of exclusive territories to promote joint
marketing of brand-name mattresses per se illegal). But see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical territorial restraints to be tested under rule of reason).
14. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying of sale of railroad's
land to requirement that purchasers ship commodities produced on such land over railroad's lines per
se illegal); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying lease of salt processing
machines to lessee's purchase of salt from manufacturer-lessor per se illegal).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (drug manufacturer's
attempt to impose retail price of its products upon independent pharmacies per se illegal); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (illegal for manufacturer of proprie-
tary medicine to set prices to be charged by independent retailers where no agency relationship be-
tween manufacturer and retailer exists).
16. The per se price fixing rule has been considered the clearest and best established of the per se
rules. See Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 NW. U.L.
REV. 137, 137, 139 (1962) (no firmer or dearer rule of antitrust law than per se price fixing rule). If
this is true, an implication of this Note's argument is that the other per se antitrust rules are even
more objectionable.
17. For justification of a per se rule on the ground that it is economically reliable, see Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-75, 2478 (1982); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 142-43
(1959); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 509-10 (2d
ed. 1980).
18. For justification of a per se rule on the grounds that it is simple to administer, see Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-75, 2478 (1982); United States v. Container
Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall J., dissenting); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra
note 17, at 142; F. SCHERER, supra note 17, at 510.
19. For justification of a per se rule on the ground that it is predictable, see Arizona v. Maricopa
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A. Economic Reliability
A per se rule against price fixing is said to be appropriate because price
fixing almost always has anticompetitive effects and almost never has
procompetitive ones, and thus is unlikely to be of net economic benefit.
"[O]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court
to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, [the
Court] has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unrea-
sonable."2 This rationale presupposes that the theory of price fixing and
the evidence for it are sufficiently well developed to obviate the need for
consideration of its positive effects in particular instances.21 Recognizing
this, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend per se analysis to
unfamiliar areas of business activity.22
B. Ease of Judicial Administration
If there were no administrative costs, there would be no need for per se
rules: Every case could be decided on the basis of the questioned practice's
effect on competition and consumer welfare. There are significant admin-
istrative costs in determining the economic effects of a course of conduct,2"
however. It is generally cheaper to inquire whether the conduct has oc-
curred than it is to investigate its effects on competition; as a result, a per
se rule is likely to be less expensive to administer than a rule of reason.
Courts have therefore declared certain forms of conduct to be per se illegal
where an economic inquiry into such conduct is expensive and the chance
that the conduct is economically -beneficial is small. Thus, a per se rule
against price fixing has been held to be justified if two costs-the cost of
formulating the rule, and of the overinclusiveness that inevitably accompa-
nies it-are less than the attendant savings in administrative costs.24 This
County Medical Soe'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-75, 2478 (1982); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note
17, at 142; F. SCHERER, supra note 17, at 510; Rahl, supra note 16, at 149.
20. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982); see Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
21. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 36 (when economic analysis and sufficient experience from
judicial inquiry show a practice can have no significant beneficial effects but is solely a means of
restricting output, practice is labeled illegal per se).
22. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) (too little known about
vertical territorial restraints and customer restrictions to make them per se illegal).
23. A per se rule avoids "the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries." Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
24. Justice Marshall has stated:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on the assumption that
the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant adminis-
trative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive harm plus the adminis-
trative costs of determining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must far
outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed
to this degree, then they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.
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justification for a per se rule assumes that price fixing rarely or never
promotes consumer welfare.2"
C. Predictability for Law and Business
Liability under a per se rule is triggered by certain actions, not by a
consideration of the purposes or effects of such actions. The court can
avoid this difficult and uncertain investigation and need ask only whether
the proscribed conduct has occurred.28 If there is a clear definition of what
constitutes proscribed conduct, judicial decisionmaking can be more con-
sistent and hence more predictable under a per se rule. Likewise, busi-
nessmen will have a clearer understanding of the legal consequences of
their actions and will be able to order their affairs more effectively.
7
The three rationales for the per se rule share the assumption that there
is a clear definition of price fixing as an economically harmful form of
conduct.28 Without such a definition, there is no basis for the claim that
price fixing consistently has anticompetitive effects, and the economic ra-
tionale for the per se rule is undermined. An unpredictable price fixing
standard also requires the expenditure of judicial time in determining the
hazy outer boundaries of the per se rule, reducing the ease with which
courts can administer this rule. Finally, an uncertain definition of price
fixing cannot provide businessmen with a reliable standard by which to
guide their conduct. The courts, however, have failed to develop a suitable
definition of price fixing.
II. The Origin of the Per Se Rule
The courts' original approach to price fixing was an attempt to elimi-
nate cartels. 9 A cartel is an agreement among producers to raise their
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 262-71
(1974) (economic analysis comparing costs of administration with costs of overinclusiveness).
25. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982); C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, supra note 17, at 143.
26. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2472-73 (1982); United States
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 365 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); R. BORK, supra note 2, at 36.37; C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, supra note 17, at f42.
27. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (1982); C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, supra note 17, at 142.
28. It should be noted that this is not a requirement of a rule of reason approach, which balances
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Indeed, a rule of reason standard explicitly recognizes that
the same conduct may have anticompetitive effects in one context and procompetitive effects in an-
other. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 189-90 (1977). The per se rule, in
contrast, assumes that the same conduct always has more anti- than pro-competitive effects.
29. The early cases in which cartels were held to violate the Sherman Act include: United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and
aftd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Robert Bork has argued that cartels were one of three basic phenomena
710
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prices above the competitive level by lowering production."0 Such an
agreement, which can be effective only if the cartel members possess mar-
ket power,3' results in a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers,
and a loss of allocative efficiency due to the lower volume of production.3 1
It is this latter result-a decrease in the overall wealth of society as a
whole-that provides the economic rationale for proscribing cartels.3 The
rule against cartels exhibited clarity, consistency, and economic sense; the
price fixing rule that it spawned lacked all three of these qualities. By
proscribing any conduct that "affects price," courts can strike down con-
duct without regard to its economic consequences.
A. From Cartels to Price Fixing
The earliest cases enforcing the Sherman Act declared cartels illegal
under section 1.14 Agreements among producers with market power 5 to
raise prices or lower output were known to have socially undesirable eco-
nomic effects. Once such an agreement was established, therefore, there
(along with monopolistic mergers and predatory business tactics) that Congress sought to prevent in
passing the Sherman Act. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7, I1 (1966). For a general view of the early history and interpretation of the Sherman Act, see W.
LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA (1965).
30. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 357 (2d ed. 1980). Under pure com-
petition, the price charged by a firm will equal its marginal cost-the cost of producing its last unit of
output. Id. at 288. By agreeing to restrict output, members of a cartel seek to create an artificial
scarcity for their good so that they are able to charge consumers a higher price. Id. at 357.
31. An effective cartel is a group of producers acting in concert as a monopoly, so that its mem-
bers collectively have the market power of a monopoly. Id. at 340-41. Producers have market power if
they collectively face a downward-sloping demand curve, so that their joint output decisions will deter-
mine what price they can charge. Id.; see also Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARv. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981) (group of firms acting jointly has market power if it is able to raise
price above marginal cost without losing so many sales so quickly that it must rescind price increase).
32. See J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 30, at 344-46. One commentator also maintains that the
possibility of gaining monopoly returns will cause a further social loss as producers expend valuable
resources in their efforts to obtain a socially undesirable monopoly. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 39 (1976). Cartels may conceivably produce efficiency gains, but the
possibility of such gains is extremely remote. See infra note 147.
33. This was recognized by Justice Peckham in the first case enforcing the Sherman Act. See
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897) (combinations whose
purpose is to control market for particular product may cause harm by raising price at whim). Rich-
ard Posner has called the elimination of formal cartels from industries subject to the Sherman Act
"the major achievement of American antitrust law." R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 39.
34. See supra note 29.
35. It is reasonable to conclude that the defendants in the early cases had considerable market
power in a defined geographic market. In Trans-Missouri, the defendants controlled all rail freight
traffic between the Pacific Ocean and the Mississippi River. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 298 (1897). In Joint Traffic, the defendants comprised "most (but not all) of the
lines engaged in the business of railroad transportation .between Chicago and the Atlantic coast."
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 506 (1898). In Addyston Pipe & Steel, the defen-
dants controlled two-thirds of the production of cast iron pipe in a market comprising over three-
quarters of the territory of the United States. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
291-92 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and afi'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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was no need for a detailed factual investigation of its actual effects. 36 The
courts refused to hear arguments that prices set by a cartel were "reasona-
ble" or that a cartel might be necessary to prevent "ruinous
competition."38
The Supreme Court expanded the set of price agreements subject to an
irrebuttable presumption of illegality from cartels to price fixing in the
Madison Oil case,"9 in which it inferred the existence of a cartel from an
agreement among the major oil companies to buy up surplus oil that had
been flooding the spot market and depressing prices."' The Court's deci-
sion was innovative in three ways. First, the Court inferred the presence
of a cartel from the agreement to buy surplus oil rather than from actual
direct regulation of price.41 Second, it stated that whether the parties to a
price fixing agreement could or did succeed in fixing prices was irrele-
vant.42 Third, the Court characterized the invidious conduct as price
36. Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Addyston Pipe & Steel were all decided against the defen-
dants without trial.
37. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 331-32 (1897); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and atfd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
38. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 330-32 (1897). In United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), the Court upheld a ruling that once cartel
behavior had been established it was unnecessary to consider the reasonableness of the prices that
were fixed or the good intentions of the cartel members. Id at 395. It should be noted that while the
Court speaks of price fixing agreements as "in themselves. . . unlawful," id. at 397, the defendants
controlled 82% of the market for vitreous pottery, and the holding was limited to "[algreements which
create such potential power." Id. This consideration of effects makes the holding in Trenton Potteries
less than a true per se rule. Furthermore, the Court based its holding on the lower court's finding that
the defendants had formed a cartel. Id. at 394. Trenton Potteries-like Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic,
and Addyston Pipe & Steel-may therefore be said to stand for a per se rule against cartels, but not
against "price fixing" simpliciter. See Note, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing-Sans Power, Pur-
pose, or Effect, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 837, 855 (1952) (Trenton Potteries precedent only for proposition
that price fixing among parties with market power unreasonable per se).
39. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
40. Id. at 190-91.
41. Id. One of the results of the rule of Madison Oil has thus been to transform the law of price
restraints into a law of conspiracy. Since the courts may abstract from any consideration of effects in
applying the per se rule, the focus of attention becomes whether the defendants agreed on a course of
conduct concerning prices. In addressing the issue of agreement, courts have applied the traditional
apparatus of the law of conspiracy. See R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 24-25. Since mere agreement to
engage in the proscribed conduct is sufficient to impose liability, a further consequence of the conspir-
acy approach is a focus on inchoate violations-the attempt to fix prices rather than actual success in
doing so. Id. at 40-41.
42. The Court in Madison Oil stated that proof of price rises in the Mid-West resulting from the
oil companies' buying program was essential to establish jurisdiction in the Western District of Wis-
consin, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59, but it added that such proof
does not mean that both a purpose and a power to fix prices are necessary for the establish-
ment of a conspiracy under § I of the Sherman Act. . . . [I]t is well established that a person
"may be guilty of conspiring although incapable of committing the objective offense.". . . It is
the "contract, combination. . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce" which § I of
the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one
hand, or successful on the other.
Id. Although footnote 59 is dicta in light of the Court's holding, it has had great influence and has
been frequently cited by both the Supreme Court and lower courts as an authoritative statement of the
per se price fixing rule. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2477
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fixing but offered no definition of this proscribed behavior, asserting only
that "[a]ny combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in
an unlawful activity.""'
Madison Oil dramatically shifted the focus of the courts' approach to
violations of section 1." In the early cases, the courts in effect declared
cartel behavior to be per se illegal and refused to inquire into the reasona-
bleness of prices or possible offsetting noneconomic benefits4 5 provided by
cartels. The refusal to consider offsetting effects presupposes the existence
of a cartel with market power, with its necessarily harmful economic con-
sequences. Madison Oil, however, focuses on price fixing rather than car-
n.23 (1982); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 497 n.12 (1968); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253, 265 n.2 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. Gasoline Retailers
Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1961); Independent Taxicab Operators' Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co.,
278 F. Supp. 979, 983 (N.D. Cal. 1968); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F. Supp.
148, 151 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Central States Theatre Corp., 187 F. Supp. 114, 145
(D. Neb. 1960).
Not even an intent to engage in harmful conduct is a requirement for liability under the Madison
Oil per se rule. 310 U.S. at 221-22; see Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (1951) (maximum price fixing by manufacturer per se illegal even though manufacturer's
purpose was to prevent distributor from reaping monopoly profits). Thus, while neither intent to
bring about competitive harm nor actual success in producing anticompetitive effects is necessary for
liability under the per se rule, either condition by itself may be sufficient. In Kiefer-Stewart the court
imposed liablility for maximum price fixing even though there was a procompetitive purpose and the
defendants lacked the monopoly power necessary to affect the market price. The only issue was
whether the defendants had agreed to set the maximum prices. See Note, supra note 38, at 862-64
(Kiefer-Stewart precedent for proposition that price fixing literally illegal per se, without regard to
power, purpose, or effect); cf. Morris, Is Price-Fixing Per Se Reasonable? A Discussion, 47 KY. L.J.
63, 79 (1958) (courts have no principled basis for distinguishing between power or economic effect
approach to price fixing and purpose or intent approach).
43. Madison Oil, 310 U.S. at 221. The difficulty with this notion of price fixing is that, stripped
of any consideration of market power or competitive effects, it lacks any economic content. See infra
pp. 714-15. Cases which have applied the per se rule in a literal sense include Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (maximum fee schedule set by physicians as part of
full-coverage health insurance plan per se illegal); Catalano v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980)
(per curiam) (agreement among beer distributors to eliminate short-term trade credit to retailers per
se illegal); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (maximum
resale prices set by distillers to counter distributor's monopoly pricing per se illegal); In re Plywood
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (agreement to maintain a delivered pricing system per
se illegal, even though total delivered prices varied among producers), cert. dismissed sub noms. Wey-
erhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 103 S. Ct. 3100
(1983); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960) (agreement by auto-
mobile dealers to adopt a schedule of "list prices" per se illegal, even though prices only used as a
starting point for bargaining with individual customers).
44. See R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 25 (after Madison Oil, rule against price fixing became part
of law of conspiracy instead of law of monopoly); c.. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U.'
CHI. L. REV. 886, 908-09 (1981) (holding in Madison Oil that law allows no inquiry into economic
justification for cooperation among rivals reversed longstanding approach to per se doctrine).
45. But see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (beneficial effects of
shortened work day relevant to determining legality of grain exchange's restriction of hours during
which its members may trade). This case was a departure from the Court's customary procedure of
considering only competitive effects of possible price restraints. Even in Chicago Board of Trade,
however, the primary rationale for the Court's decision upholding the exchange's restriction of trading
hours was the improved market it created. Id. at 240-41.
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tels; as a result, courts can proscribe activities even though no invidious
purpose or harmful economic consequences have been established, and
even though the economic results of the conduct may be of net benefit to
consumers. In practice, this expansion of liability for price fixing has al-
lowed a great deal of arbitrariness in the decisionmaking process. Literal
application of the per se rule would strike down virtually all commercial
agreements, but it is clear that not all agreements that somehow affect
price are per se illegal.46 Unfortunately, the per se approach provides no
basis for distinguishing exceptions. Economic considerations are fre-
quently downplayed in favor of the conclusory label of price fixing.
47
Under the per se approach, the principal issue in price fixing cases is
often the characterization of the agreement in question. A characterization
that ignores market power and economic effects, however, is bound to be
arbitrary.
B. Lack of an Economic Theory of "Price Fixing"
Effective application of a per se rule against price fixing presupposes a
well-established theory of price fixing as an economically indefensible ac-
tivity.48 The concept of price fixing announced in Madison Oil, however,
imposes liability for conduct apart from any consideration of the conduct's
economic effects-it is a legal rather than an economic category. Not every
"agreement concerning price" is economically invidious (as witnessed by
the well-recognized exceptions to the per se rule49), but rather agreements
by producers with market power to restrict output and raise prices above
competitive levels." The per se rule against price fixing thus undermines
competition and consumer welfare. In addition, without a clear basis in
economic theory for determining what price fixing is, the rationales sup-
porting the use of a per se rule are far less persuasive.
Thus, there is an unresolved tension between the legal approach to
46. Virtually all commercial transactions, from the simplest sales contract to more complex ar-
rangements such as partnership agreements and joint ventures, "fix" price in some way. The recog-
nized validity of such commercial arrangements-indeed, their indispensability for the functioning of
a market economy-requires many exceptions to a literal per se rule. See id. at 238 (every commercial
agreement restrains trade; true test of legality of a restraint must be whether it suppresses or destroys
competition); cf United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (re-
straints of trade valid at common law if reasonably necessary to protect interests of buyer of property,
to advance legitimate ends of a partnership, or to protect employer's business from unjust use of
confidential information by former employee), modified and afild, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). These re-
straints have continued to be upheld under the Sherman Act. See United States v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (joint venture or partnership formed for pur-
pose of promoting legitimate business enterprise lawful under Sherman Act), modified and ai'd, 341
U.S. 593 (1951).
47. See infra pp. 717-20.
48. See supra p. 709.
49. See supra note 46.
50. See supra pp. 710-11.
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price fixing under the per se rule and the economic basis for its prohibi-
tion. Since there is no economic theory of harm from price fixing apart
from the harms from anticompetitive cartels, it is impossible to discern
price fixing in other than a merely literal sense without examining the
purpose and effects of the questioned behavior and the market structure
within which it has occurred. As a result, the distinction between charac-
terizing a practice as price fixing and determining its purpose and effect,
and hence the distinction between the per se rule and a rule of reason,
cannot ultimately be maintained.5 In practice, the per se rule must either
become identical with the rule of reason or give rise to an arbitrary and
conclusory labeling of agreements that happen to concern price in some
respect.
III. Invidious Consequences of the Per Se Rule
The lack of clarity about what constitutes "price fixing" and the inade-
quate guidance provided by the standard of Madison Oil are reflected in
the kinds of legal arguments used to assign liability under the per se rule.
A. Divergence of Legal Theories from Economic Harm
Because price fixing as a legal category has no coherent economic ra-
tionale, it allows courts to develop legal theories of liability that have little
connection with economic harm. This lack of congruence may be seen
from a review of the various inferences that can be used to support a
holding of price fixing.
Three broad types of per se price fixing theories may be distinguished:
(i) cases involving explicit cartel agreements,5" (ii) cases in which cartel
behavior is inferred from agreements or other behavior not directly con-
cerned with prices, 53 and (iii) cases involving some aspect of price where
51. But see R. BORK, supra note 2, at 263-79 (arguing that necessary exceptions to per se rule do
not detract from its merit since they can be given a principled basis by means of the distinction
between primary and ancillary restraints). For a discussion of Bork's views, see infra pp. 727-28.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (rate fixing by
railroad cartel that controlled all rail traffic between the Mississippi and Pacific, including written
articles of agreement providing for voting and enforcement procedures); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (cartel of steel pipe manufacturers, which controlled two-
thirds of the production of steel pipe in a market comprising three-quarters of the territory of the
United States, set prices and organized bid rigging on contracts), modified and afld, 175 U.S. 211
(1899); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (cartel of bathroom fixture manufac-
turers, which controlled 82% of market for vitreous pottery, set prices and restricted output); Virginia
Excelsior Mills v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958) (exclusive sales agent set prices for indepen-
dent excelsior producers who accounted for 25% of East Coast production); United States v. American
Smelting & Ref. Co., 182 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (joint selling agreement between two largest
lead miners in U.S.).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Madison Oil) (car-
tel of oil producers inferred from agreement to buy up surplus oil on spot market); National Maca-
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the court develops no cartel theory or other explanation of how the behav-
ior in question is anticompetitive. This third class may, in turn, be divided
into two subclasses: cases in which the agreement regarding price is ex-
plicit,5 and those in which the court infers an agreement from parallel
conduct or communications.55 While a per se rule may be appropriate for
the first class of cases,56 it is inappropriate for the other two.
1. Inferred Price Fixing
Where cartel behavior is inferred from behavior not directly concerning
price, the court should have a theory of how the activity in question will
result in higher prices or reduced output. In one ostensibly per se case,57
the court peeked at the economic merits and propounded such a theory,
inferring price fixing on the part of buyers from an agreement to set qual-
ity standards.58 The court ostensibly applied the per se rule but nonethe-
less recognized that the buyers were exercising market power in their
purchases of a production input." In Madison Oil itself,"0 on the other
hand, the Supreme Court presumed that the program of buying surplus
oil on the spot market raised prices in the forward contract market."' It is
unclear, however, how the buying program could have had any effect on
the long-run supply of oil available in the forward contract market.
6 2
Since the storage facilities of the major producers were finite, the oil they
purchased on the spot market would eventually find its way into the for-
ward contract market, thereby depressing prices. The mere agreement to
roni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964) (buyers' cartel of macaroni manufacturers inferred
from agreement to reduce percentage of durum wheat used in macaroni products), al'd, 345 F.2d 421
(7th Cir. 1965).
54. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (maximum fees
set by physicians); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(maximum price fixing by distiller); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.
1960) (circulation of price list by automobile dealers).
55. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam) (alleged
agreement among beer distributors to eliminate short-term credit to retailers); In re Plywood Antitrust
Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (agreement to fix plywood prices inferred from manufacturers'
use of common delivered price system), cert. dismissed sub noms. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb
Co. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983).
56. At least one commentator believes that even explicit cartel agreements can sometimes promote
efficiency. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 435-39.
57. National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
58. The manufacturers of macaroni agreed to reduce its semolina content in response to a
shortage of durum wheat, from which semolina is made. Id. at 424.
59. The macaroni industry was the only market for durum wheat. National Macaroni Mfrs.
Ass'n v. FTC, 65 F.T.C. 583, 611 (1974), alfd, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
60. United.States v. Socony-Vaccum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Madison Oil).
61. Id. at 190-91.
62. This does not mean that the major producers did not engage in some sort of anticompetitive
activity; the Court's analysis, however, failed to show how they did so.
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buy up oil on the spot market, without more, could not have had the effect
that the Court. attributed to it.
2. Behavior Affecting Price
If the questioned behavior merely concerns or affects price in some
way, the court should require a showing that this behavior is anticompeti-
tive before striking it down. Where an agreement to set a single element of
price (but not the total price) is inferred on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, the.per se approach becomes especially arbitrary. In a recent
case, e" three Southern plywood manufacturers were found guilty of per se
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to maintain a
uniform system of "delivered" pricing." In accordance with the per se
approach, no adverse effect on total prices was found or even considered. 5
Plywood was originally manufactured exclusively from Western fir in
the Pacific Northwest and shipped to all parts of the country from this
region." Prices were quoted as a mill price plus rail freight delivery
charges from the West Coast.67 When the Southern mills entered the mar-
ket,68 they too quoted a mill or index price plus delivery charges, but the
Southern quotes included delivery charges from the West Coast, even
though the actual delivery costs to buyers in the South and East were
63. In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed sub noms. Wey-
erhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 103 S.Ct. 3100
(1983). The Plywood case was settled for $165 million. Potential liability was estimated at $2 billion.
Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1982, at 3, col. 1. In an appeal from a case brought by the FTC under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act and tried on the same facts as Plywood, the Ninth Circuit
reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Fifth Circuit. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573
(9th Cir. 1980) (no liability for alleged agreement to adopt delivered price system since defendant's
conduct was consistent with competitive behavior).
64. In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d at 633.
65. The issue that the court addressed in finding a violation of section 1 was whether the defen-
dants had conspired to use the delivered pricing system. Id. at 632. The court also considered the
defendants' use of "standard weights," a common practice in the plywood industry arising from the
need to quote a firm price before the actual weight (which depends in part on the type of wood used
in the manufacturing process) is known. In re Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 30-31 (1978), rev'd,
637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). The standardized weights were contained in the 1934 National Recov-
ery Act Code of Fair Competition and subsequently published by the Office of War Information in
1943 and by the Office of Price Stabilization in 1952. Id. at 31 n.43. Since the use of standard weights
presents issues analogous to those raised by the West Coast freight pricing scheme, and since the use
of that scheme would have been a sufficient basis for a section 1 violation under the Fifth Circuit's
holding, the discussion here is limited to the West Coast freight issue.
66. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 574. Freight charges from the West Coast were computed on the basis of concentric
zones radiating eastward from Portland, Oregon. Charges were identical within any single zone. Id.
68. In 1963, Georgia Pacific, one of the defendants, achieved a technological breakthrough that
enabled it to make plywood from Southern pine. See In re Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 12
(1978), rev'd, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). It opened the first plywood mill in the South in 1964. Id.
Other companies quickly followed this lead, and by 1971 there were 51 Southern plywood mills in
operation. Id. at 3.
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lower than they would have been from the West Coast. 9 The Southern
index prices were not actual "free on board" (f.o.b.) mill prices;70 instead,
they were adjusted to offset the West Coast delivery charges.71 Index
prices at the Southern mills varied among producers72 and fluctuated
widely over time.73
It is unlikely that an agreement to maintain a method of price quota-
tion, in the absence of any showing that total price was affected, has an
anticompetitive effect.7 4 Indeed, the seemingly peculiar method for quoting
prices of the Southern manufacturers has a clear procompetitive justifica-
tion. It reduces information costs to consumers comparing Western and
Southern plywood7 5 by enabling them to compare the respective mill
prices directly and to determine the total delivered price simply by adding
the same standard freight charge to each mill quotation. 6 With plywood
prices changing daily and even hourly and with buyers requesting quota-
tions from Southern and Western producers by telephone,7 the ability to
make quick comparisons among simple index prices was a significant ad-
69. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 578.
71. Id. at 580.
72. Id. at 579.
73. 46 Record on Appeal at 525-26; 54 Record on Appeal at 2753, 2770-71, In re Plywood
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed sub noms. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman
Lamb Co. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983).
74. Commentators differ on the rationale and effects of a basing-point pricing system. Compare
Stigler, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 1143 (1949), reprinted in G.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 147 (1968) (basing-point price system facilitates carte-
lization by more evenly distributing sales among cartel members in geographically dispersed markets
characterized by wide fluctuations in demand) with Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs.
Collusive Theories, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 289, 290 (1982) (competitive participants in spatially dis-
persed market "have no reasonable alternative" to basing-point system). The fact that Southern index
prices differed both from one another and from West Coast mill prices distinguishes Plywood from
earlier cases in which liability was imposed for concerted adoption of a basing-point system. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (concerted adoption of a multiple basing-point system and
persistent identity of base prices); Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (concerted main-
tenance of basing-point system including agreement to adhere to published prices); Allied Paper Mills
v. FTC, 168 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948) (overt agreement regarding all aspects of price, including
uniform base prices), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); c. Boise Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 70
(1978) (no showing that West Coast freight system operated in manner of classic basing-point system
and no showing that southern plywood industry follows an absolutely uniform base price to which
West Coast freight is added), rev'd on other grounds, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. Because buyers were accustomed to the West Coast freight quotation method, this ease of
price comparison helped the Southern mills enter the market. It remained important after entry since
buyers in some parts of the country continued to purchase both Southern and Western plywood.
76. The reduction of information costs aids competition. See F. SCHERER, supra note 17, at 11
(perfect knowledge of present and future market conditions prerequisite for pure competition); R.
POSNER, supra note 32, at 136 (since information is costly to acquire, customers may lack good infor-
mation about competitive alternatives facing them); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 23, at 268 (rapid dissem-
ination of price information prerequisite for competitive market).
77. 45 Record on Appeal at 299; 48 Record on Appeal at 1035, 1071, 1075, In re Plywood
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed sub noms. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman
Lamb Co. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983).
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vantage.7 8 The result was increased competition among all plywood pro-
ducers and reduced search costs for plywood consumers.
79
Assuming that the Southern plywood manufacturers had agreed to
maintain the West Coast freight price quotation method, they may be said
to have engaged in "price fixing" in a literal sense: Their concerted action
had some effect on price, namely, on the method of price quotation. How-
ever, the connection between the per se rule against price fixing and the
economic justification for the early rule proscribing cartels is extremely
tenuous in the Plywood case. The rationale on which liability was predi-
cated is twice removed from proof of cartelization: First, the proscribed
actions merely concerned price, but prompted no consideration by the
court of anticompetitive effects; second, an agreement to use the West
Coast price quotation scheme was inferred from parallel behavior and
business contacts.80 Where the relation of proscribed behavior to anticom-
petitive harm is so remote, it is clear that the courts have gone far beyond
the rationale for the rule against cartels laid down in the early cases.81
If liability can be based on any concerted conduct that affects price in
any way, the plaintiff will try to prove agreement or conspiracy,82 since
this will probably be easier than showing an anticompetitive effect. 83 Be-
cause of the wide latitude available to triers of fact in applying standards
78. This was especially true since Southern freight rates were calculated on a point-to-point basis
and varied according to the weight of the load. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 574 n.1
(9th Cir. 1980). This would make it difficult for buyers to make rapid price comparisons if actual mill
prices were quoted.
79. By facilitating price comparisons among sellers, the West Coast pricing scheme may also have
narrowed the dispersion of prices, thereby increasing allocative efficiency. See R. POSNER, supra note
32, at 135-47 (the more information sellers have about prices of competitors, the more efficient the
market); Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67
GEO. L.J. 1187, 1188 (1979) (exchange of price information reduces incidence of prices that reflect
ignorance of buyers and sellers about conditions of supply and demand). It is true, however, that this
rationale would have provided an incentive for agreement to adopt the West Coast freight pricing
system. In the absence of any agreement to fix total delivered prices, however, such an agreement may
have had procompetitive effects.
80. In Ethyl Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,003 (F.T.C. Mar. 22, 1983), the FTC
found that certain "facilitating practices" by the manufacturers of lead antiknock compounds-which
included advance notice of price changes, "most-favored-nation" price clauses in sales contracts and a
uniform delivered price system-constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, even though such practices were adopted independently. Con-
trary to the Fifth Circuit's approach in Plywood, however, the Commission applied a rule of reason
standard, id. at 22,526, and emphasized the importance of a detailed economic analysis of the struc-
ture of the industry and the effects of the practices in question, id. at 22,531.
81. See supra pp. 710-11.
82. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST. CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS 306-08 (2d ed. 1981).
83. Thus, the court in Plywood ignored the issue of whether or how the West Coast freight
pricing system produced anticompetitive effects and merely addressed the question of whether there
was an agreement to adopt that system. See id. at 307-08; see also Priest, Cartels and Patent Licenses,
20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 312 (1977) (many declarations of managers ambiguous and consistent with
either collusive or competitive intent).
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of proof in conspiracy cases8" and the unpredictable effects of circumstan-
tial evidence on juries unacquainted with normal industry practices,8 5 the
per se rule has been a source of unpredictability in the calculations of both
businessmen and lawyers, 6 contrary to one of its purported rationales.
8 7
Furthermore, the expensive discovery associated with conspiracy cases"
offsets some of the savings in administrative costs that traditionally have
been attributed to the per se rule.89
A true per se rule ignores economic power or effects in determining
liability. The analysis so far has focused on the discrepancy between the
economic effects of actions and the legal inferences by which they may be
held to be price fixing. The invidious consequences of this discrepancy are
only exacerbated when a per se rule is tacitly supplemented by a rule of
reason approach.
B. Erratic Application
With respect to agreements that concern price in some way but do not
fall within the well-established exceptions,9" three outcomes are possible:
(i) the agreement may be struck down as per se illegal;91 (ii) the agree-
ment may be struck down under a rule of reason approach;92 or (iii) the
agreement may be upheld as legal.93
There is no principled basis for determining which of these approaches
will be used by the courts. For example, in the ASCAP case, 9' the owners
84. The Plywood cases are a good example of this. On the same set of facts, the Fifth Circuit
found sufficient proof of agreement but the Ninth Circuit did not. See supra note 63.
85. See F. SCHERER, supra note 17, at 510-11.
86. Cf Bloom, A Guide to Antitrust, 20 BUs. LAW. 61, 61-62 (1964) (individual noncooperative
action key to legality in all business relations, yet "such conduct is impossible").
87. See supra p. 710.
88. See R. POSNER & F. FASTERBROOK, supra note 82, at 595-98 (discovery of millions of docu-
ments routine).
89. Cf id. at 597 (uncertain rule increases number of cases that must be litigated and reduces
likelihood of settlement).
90. See supra note 46.
91. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982); United States
v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d
128 (9th Cir. 1960).
92. See, e.g., National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In some cases the court claims to apply a per se rule
but in fact applies a truncated rule of reason analysis. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (1982) ("[L]imited record in this case not inconsistent with the presump-
tion that . . . agreements will not enhance competition."); United States v. Container Corp. of Am.,
393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) ("[T]he corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively few
sellers.").
93. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (ASCAP).
94. Id. For discussion of ASCAP, see Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing
Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REV.
879, 897-99 (1980) (ASCAP places small, undefined area beyond reach of per se rule); Robinson,
Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-26 (1980) (ASCAP may signal
revitalization of rule of reason for some price restraints).
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of musical compositions had formed associations to license performances of
their works on a "blanket" basis.9 A broadcaster decided that the price of
its blanket license was rising too fast and attempted to obtain per-use li-
censes from the musical associations. When the associations refused to
grant per-use licenses, the broadcaster brought suit under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The Court held that the blanket licenses were not illegal
per se even though the musical associations set one price for a blanket
license and thus in some sense "fixed" a single price for individual compo-
sitions that might otherwise compete against one another. The Court
noted that because the blanket license allows immediate and inexpensive
use of covered compositions and greater flexibility in the use of musical
material,9" it is in effect a different product from the separate composi-
tions of individual composers.9 7 The music associations were thus not ac-
tually fixing the price of their individual compositions but setting a price
for the new product-the blanket license.98
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,9" the Court reached
the opposite conclusion about a situation similar to ASCAP. In Maricopa,
a group of physicians had formed "foundations" to set maximum fee
schedules that members could charge to holders of an insurance plan.100
The insurers agreed to pay the full amount of their insureds' medical bills
charged by participating physicians. 101 The Court held that the physi-
cians' setting of maximum fees to the insureds was illegal under the per se
rule against price fixing.102
The court of appeals in Maricopa03 had held that the physicians' plan
was not a per se violation but rather had to be evaluated in terms of
purpose and effect.104 In deciding instead that the plan fell under the pro-
95. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979). The "blan-
ket" license allowed the licensee to pay a flat fee and perform any composition owned by members of
the associations as many times as desired. Id. Individual composer members were still free to negotiate
separate licensing arrangements on their own. Id.
96. Id. at 20. Effective enforcement of a per-use license would require the licensor to monitor all
performances of the licensee. The blanket license eliminated the need for such costly monitoring. Id.
97. Id.
98. "[T]o the extent the blanket license is a different product, ASCAP is not really a joint sales
agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a separate seller offering its blanket li-
cense, of which the individual compositions are raw material." Id. at 22. The Court remanded the
case for consideration of the legality of the blanket license under a rule of of reason. Id. at 25.
99. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). See generally Weller, Antitrust and Health Care: Provider Controlled
Health Plans and the Maricopa Decision, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 223 (1982) (health care industry
subject to same antitrust scrutiny applied to other industries); Note, Antitrust Foundations for Medi-
cal Care: Characterization of Maximum Fee Schedules, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293 (Maricopa circuit
court correct to refuse to characterize Maricopa plan as per se illegal).
100. 102 S. Ct. at 2470-71.
101. Id. at 2471.
102. Id. at 2472-80.
103. 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
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scription of the per se rule, the Supreme Court speculated on possible
anticompetitive effects of the plan without attempting to establish which,
if any, of these effects would actually occur. The Court suggested that the
plan might provide disincentives for more skillful physicians by rewarding
all physicians equally,105 and that the plan might discourage experimenta-
tion, innovation, and entry into the market by competing physicians.106
The Court, however, did not consider the plausibility of such anticompeti-
tive effects given that participation was voluntary for physicians and pa-
tients, that there were many physicians who would not be members of the
plan, and that member physicians remained free to treat patients who
were not plan members.1 7
The Court also maintained that there was no efficiency justification for
the plan, since its benefits could be achieved by having the insurers set the
maximum fees.1 08 In fact, however, the physicians could not allow the
insurers to set maximum fees, since the physicians would have no way of
offsetting fees they perceived as too low, for example, as a result of rising
costs. But whatever fees the physicians set, the insurance companies would
be able to adjust their premiums accordingly-and still charge a lower
premium than if their liability were completely unlimited.
Furthermore, just as in ASCAP, the defendants in Maricopa were en-
gaged in marketing a new product-low-cost, full-coverage health insur-
ance. 09 As in ASCAP, the new product was a "blanket" response to the
high transaction costs of per-use purchases.1 0 In sum, there is no princi-
pled way to distinguish Maricopa from ASCAP. A rule so erratically ap-
plied can hardly be justified on the grounds that it provides enhanced
predictability.
C. Inconsistency
The justification for the per se rule is further undermined by the incon-
sistency of the rule with certain well-established lines of decisions. Appli-
105. Id. at 2475.
106. Id.
107. The arrangement allowed insureds to use the services of nonparticipating physicians (in
which case coverage would extend only to the maximum amounts set under the plan), id. at 2472, and
also allowed participating physicians to charge whatever fees they chose to patients not covered by the
plan, id. at 2471.
108. Id.
109. See Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 898-900.
110. Maximum fee schedules set by providers entail fewer transaction costs than those set by
insurers, since under an insurer-determined fee schedule, each provider would have to make a sepa-
rate decision to accept or reject each insurer's fee schedule, while under a provider-determined fee
schedule each provider and each insurer would only have to make a single decision-whether or not to
participate in the plan. Id. at 898. Easterbrook also points out that insurers have less information than
suppliers about the relative costs of particular services, so that fee schedules set by insurers are less
likely to clear the market. Id.
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cation of the per se rule in cases involving single-element price fixing . is
inconsistent with the courts' rule of reason approach to the similar or
functionally equivalent arrangements involving standardization programs
and exchanges of information.
Exchanges of information are subject to a rule of reason analysis in
which the courts look at the purposes and effects of the arrangements and
the market power of the parties."1 The courts recognize that the exchange
of price information in competitive markets increases competition: In or-
der for a seller to meet or undercut the prices of his competitors, he must
know what those prices are; in order to set an efficient level of production,
he must know how much customers are willing to pay.1"' Likewise dis-
semination of price data may promote a competitive equilibrium in the
market by making it easier for customers to compare prices.11 4 The ille-
gality of informational activities must therefore depend on more than
whether there was an agreement to exchange price information.
Standardization programs are also subject to a rule of reason treatment
111. Single-element price fixing is the fixing of some aspect of price, such as credit terms or
delivery charges. See, e.g., Catalano Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam)
(alleged agreement among beer distributors to eliminate short term credit to retailers); In re Plywood
Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleged agreement to maintain delivered price system),
cert. dismissed sub noms. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Lyman Lamb Co., 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983).
112. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (exchange of price
information without intent to fix prices not criminal price fixing per se); United States v. Citizens &
S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975) ("[Tlhe dissemination of price information is not itself a per
se violation of the Sherman Act."); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925)
(mere dissemination of information not unreasonable restraint in absence of attempt to curtail produc-
tion or raise prices); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (exchange of
price and statistical information illegal where manifest purpose and necessary tendency of the entire
arrangement was to suppress competition). In United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333
(1969), the Court struck down a price verification agreement, purportedly under the per se rule. At
least one court later interpreted Container as standing for the rule that agreements among competitors
to exchange price information with the purpose and effect of stabilizing the market are a per se
violation, apparently ignoring the inconsistency involved in characterizing a per se rule in terms of
"purpose and effect." United States v. F.M.C. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The
Container Court's analysis, however, is more consistent with a rule of reason. The Court stated that
while "[pirice information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive price
...the corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively few sellers . . . .The product is
fungible and the competition for sales is price. The demand is inelastic. . . ." Container, 393 U.S. at
337. In any case, the Supreme Court later declared explicitly that dissemination of price information
is not a per se violation. United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (citing concur-
ring opinion in Container).
113. Dissemination of price information "tends to stabilize trade and industry, to produce fairer
price levels and to avoid the waste which inevitably attends the unintelligent conduct of economic
enterprise." Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 593 (1925); cf. L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 28, at 268 (price information exchanges promote competition in competitive markets but
facilitate collusion in oligopolistic markets). But see Posner, supra note 79, at 1197-99 (exchanges of
price information always narrow the dispersion of prices and should be legal per se, but may be used
as evidence of conspiracy to fix prices).
114. Id.
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by the courts." 5 With standardization competition may become more ef-
fective, as consumers can focug on prices, which can be readily compared,
rather than on quality, which is difficult to compare.11 These possible
procompetitive effects lead the courts to take a rule of reason approach to
standardization.
There are circumstances under which price restraints have the same
effects as quality restraints. The delivered pricing system in Plywood, for
example, had the effect of facilitating price comparisons by buyers:
117
Standardizing delivery charges while allowing total prices to fluctuate in
response to competitive forces is the functional equivalent of product
standardization. Since the courts have routinely taken a rule of reason
approach to standardization programs on the ground that they facilitate
price comparisons, consistency requires an equivalent treatment of cases
involving the setting of a single element of price.
The holding in Plywood is similarly inconsistent with the established
judicial approach to information exchanges. Because the Plywood system
of delivered prices facilitated price comparisons, it had the same effect as a
dissemination of price information among customers and should thus have
been subject to the rule of reason applied to exchanges of price informa-
tion. It is only the totemic significance attached to "price fixing" that has
prevented a recognition of the structural similarity of these situations.
Furthermore, the per se rule is on its face inconsistent with the well-
established rule of reason approach to exchanges of price information. As
enunciated in Madison Oil, the per se rule specifically includes under its
ban agreements "stabilizing" prices.118 One purpose of exchanges of price
information, however, is precisely to lower the dispersion of prices so that
producers can better adjust their pricing and output decisions to the condi-
tions of the market.11 The blanket proscription of any "tamper[ing] with
115. See, e.g., Bond Crown & Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1949) (standardization
of bottle caps innocent in itself but not when combined with standardization of discounts and other
agreements); Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (lst Cir. 1949) (standardization of tags and
exchange of price information upheld); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261
F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966) (refusal of association to certify particular type of plywood as meeting
commerical standards not a restraint of trade), afTld, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1024 (1969); Roofire Alarm Co. v. Underwriter's Laboratories, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
Tenn. 1959) (testing corporation's standards as to warning devices not unreasonable), aftd men., 284
F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1960). In National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), aFTd,
345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965), the Commission declared a standardization program illegal per se but
in fact applied a truncated rule of reason analysis. See supra p. 716.
116. Furthermore, product differentiation may allow sellers to reap monopoly profits to the extent
they can succeed in making their products appear unique. The theory is that if buyers perceive a
product as qualitatively unique, they will be willing to pay more for it than they would have if it had
perfect substitutes. See F. SCHERER, supra note 17, at 380-84. From this perspective too, then, product
standardization may benefit consumers.
117. See supra pp. 718-19.
118. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (Madison Oil).
119. According to Richard Posner,
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price structures. 1 . in Madison Oil cannot be reconciled with the rule of
reason approach to information exchanges. This inconsistency is yet an-
other source of uncertainty and unpredictability created by the per se rule.
D. Efficiencies from "Price Fixing"
The per se rule has also led courts to proscribe much efficiency-promot-
ing activity. Possible productive efficiencies were proscribed in Maricopa,
and possible informational efficiencies were ruled per se illegal in Ply-
wood. Where the potential for such efficiencies exists, the courts should
adopt a rule of reason approach that takes account of the purpose and
effects of these arrangements and the market power of the parties
involved."'
The courts have typically adopted such an approach in other areas
where the potential for efficiency gains has been recognized. Thus, part-
nerships 22 and joint ventures123 are generally evaluated using a rule of
reason, even though both arrangements may involve some agreement as to
price. A law partnership, for example, involves an agreement among the
partners to set the fees they will charge for their services, but it also cre-
ates efficiencies from division of labor, specialization, and shared over-
head. 2 4 While partnerships may be used as a vehicle for collusive re-
straints,125 their potential for efficiency gains justifies the rule of reason
The purpose of a legitimate exchange of price information is to narrow the dispersion of
prices-that is, to eliminate as far as possible those prices in the tails of the price distribution
that reflect the ignorance of buyers or sellers concerning the conditions of supply and demand.
There is no reason to expect the price level-the average price in the market-to change.
Posner, supra note 79, at 1188. This lesser dispersion also benefits consumers by lowering their search
costs. Id. at 1195.
120. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
121. The use of the per se rule to proscribe possible efficiencies is particularly striking in some
patent licensing cases. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). The case is dis-
cussed in Priest, supra note 83, at 350-55 (fixing of licensee prices by licensor-patentee may deter
erosion of royalty, evoke presale services, or contribute to efficiency where costs fall unexpectedly after
license is negotiated).
122. The legality of partnerships formed for legitimate purposes was established early in the his-
tory of the interpretation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505,
567-68 (1898) (contract of partnership not restraint of trade under reasonable construction of Sher-
man Act); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (reduction in
competition created by partnership legal since it is only ancillary to main purpose of agreement),
modified and atfd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
123. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 302 (2d Cir. 1979)
(lawfulness of joint venture to be evaluated in terms of size and market share of participants, contri-
bution of each party, likelihood that each participant would undertake similar project in absence of
joint venture, nature of ancillary restraints imposed, and reasonableness of restraints in relation to
purpose of venture), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964) (test of legality of joint ventures under Clayton Act is whether joint venture is likely
to injure competition); see also Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1535 (1982) (joint ventures evaluated under rule of reason in absence of flagrant cartel practices).
124. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 265-66.
125. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1949)
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that courts apply to them. Similarly, joint ventures may create efficiencies
in the form of new productive capacity, new technology, or a new product
or entry into a new market,1 26 and it is therefore appropriate that they too
be analyzed under the rule of reason.
The ill-defined notion of price fixing used by the courts in applying the
per se rule has led to the proscription of activities that can plausibly be
characterized as joint ventures and that therefore deserve consideration
under a rule of reason. In United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental
System, Inc.,127 for example, a group of independent owners set up the
defendant corporation to facilitate establishment of a one-way trailer
rental business. 128 The corporation allowed its members to rent trailers on
a one-way basis to destinations at which there was another member sta-
tion;129 the owners of the trailers (each of whom operated at least one
station) and the operators of the stations to which they were sent split the
rental fees." The defendant circulated suggested fee schedules13' as well
as a form lease containing a fixed rate for overtime.132 The district court
found this conduct to be "price fixing" and declared it "illegal per se"
under the Sherman Act. "'
The court thereby overlooked the efficiencies that may be created by a
centralized dissemination of price information. First, the scheme made
possible an enormous savings in transaction costs. The corporation's mem-
bers owned over 10,000 trailers, each of which made an average of fifteen
moves per year.1 " The costs of bilateral negotiations to determine rental
fees for each of these 150,000 transactions would have been considerable.
Second, the fee schedule facilitated more accurate pricing. While an inde-
pendent trailer owner in Maine, for example, would have difficulty know-
ing what price to charge for a rental from Denver to San Francisco, the
central headquarters of the corporation could more cheaply monitor sup-
ply and demand across the country and suggest the most competitive
rental prices.
(partnership illegal when formed for purpose of allocating exclusive sales territories, fixing prices, and
eliminating competition), modified and aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
126. See Brodley, supra note 123, at 1526. Joint ventures and partnerships by no means exhaust
the variety of joint economic activities that may create new products or efficiency gains and that have
therefore been analyzed under a rule of reason. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 634 F.2d 1197 (1980) (antitrust suit against NFL, an unincorporated association, for rule
requiring three-fourths vote of team owners before league member could transfer location of home
games).
127. 156 F. Supp. 800 (D. Kan.), afl'd mem., 355 U.S. 10 (1957).
128. Id. at 802.
129. Id. at 801.
130. Id. at 804.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 805.
134. Id.
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The efficiencies that may be created by such "price fixing" agreements
as those in Nationwide Trailer and Maricopa are similar to those availa-
ble from joint ventures: In both cases, cooperative efforts provide a prod-
uct or service that might otherwise not be available to consumers. Because
a per se rule automatically strikes down such cooperative activities if they
can be labeled "price fixing," the per se rule should be replaced by a rule
of reason for price restraints, which would allow the potential for effi-
ciency gains to be taken into account in deciding the legality of such
arrangements. 3 5
IV. Dispensing with the Per Se Rule
Although one commentator has argued that the invidious effects of the
per se rule can be avoided if the rule is properly interpreted, this attempt
to save the per se rule is internally inconsistent.
A. Bork's Analysis of the Per Se Rule
Robert Bork has argued that the exceptions to the per se rule for legiti-
mate commercial arrangements such as partnerships do not detract from
the rule's merit,1 3 6 since these exceptions can be given a principled basis
by means of the distinction between primary and ancillary restraints.
13 7
According to Bork, if a price restraint accompanies a "contract integra-
tion"138 or contributes to the efficiency of such an integration, it is ancil-
lary and should be tested by the rule of reason.139 If a price restraint is
not ancillary, it is "naked" and should be struck down by the per se
rule. 4 O
The chief difficulty with this approach is that it merely pushes analysis
135. Although the concern here is solely with horizontal restraints, the courts have also insisted
upon a per se approach in numerous cases involving the vertical practice of resale price maintenance.
They have done so despite recent scholarship indicating that resale price maintenance may be neces-
sary to avoid the "free rider" problem in connection with enhanced point-of-sale services. See R.
BORK, supra note 2, at 280-98; R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 147-66; Bork, The Rule of Reason and
the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 429-64 (1966).
136. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 267. According to Bork, Madison Oil is one of the "great cases"
establishing the per se rule. Id. at 263.
137. Id. at 267. Bork traces his notion of ancillary restraints back to Judge Taft's opinion in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-83 (6th Cir. 1898) (agreement of partners
not to compete with partnership one of the ancillary restraints legal at common law and by implica-
tion under Sherman Act), modified and affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
138. The term "contract integration," as used by Bork, appears to include any cooperative pro-
ductive activity not organized as a corporation. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 264. Thus, just as horizontal
mergers between corporations may create efficiencies by integrating productive activities, so too may
contract integrations such as partnerships or joint ventures. Id. For the economic basis of the distinc-
tion between contract integration and organization as a firm, see Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).
139. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 264.
140. Id.
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back to the question of when a restraint is ancillary, a question that must
be addressed in terms of the power-purpose-effects analysis of the rule of
reason.1"1 Thus, in the example Bork gives, the agreement among the
members of a law partnership to set the fees for their services is an ancil-
lary restraint because it is incidental to the main purpose of providing
legal services more efficiently.1 2 To determine whether a restraint is an-
cillary it is thus necessary to know its purpose, but an investigation of
purpose is an element of a rule of reason analysis, not of a per se rule.
Furthermore, in order to know the purpose of an agreement, it is often
necessary to examine its probable effects, 4 8 another inquiry characteristic
of a rule of reason. Thus, Bork's approach is really a truncated rule of
reason analysis and is inconsistent with the per se rule he wishes to re-
tain. 144 Furthermore, by permitting the courts to retain the per se rule in
the judicial arsenal, Bork's approach would still allow the arbitrary label-
ing that has been the chief disadvantage of the per se rule.1 45 Bork's for-
mulation of the per se rule would also incur the costs of overinclusiveness
associated with deciding disputes using blanket categories, rather than on
a case-by-case basis. For example, Bork's approach would continue to
proscribe informational efficiencies, such as those in Plywood, that are not
associated with any contract integration.146 Completely dispensing with
the per se rule would bring greater consistency to the case law and pro-
mote many more efficient but currently proscribed activities than would be
allowed under Bork's approach.
141. See supra note 7.
142. Bork elaborates upon Judge Taft's analysis in Addyston Pipe & Steel: "Taft argued that the
elimination of competition inherent in the joining of men as partners was justified because 'this effect
was only an incident to the main purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry
on a successful business, and one useful to the Community.'" R. BORK, supra note 2, at 264 (quoting
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and afl'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899)).
143. Bork infers a benign purpose for a law partnership because "[n]obody supposes that a law
firm in New York fixes its fees. . . for the purpose of restricting output. Each firm faces the rivalry
of scores or hundreds of other firms, so that output restriction is not a tenable hypothesis." Id. at 265.
The finding of ancillarity here involves a determination of the market power of the partners and the
probable effects of their agreement.
144. "None of this [primary/ancillary] analysis in any way detracts from the merit of the per se
rule." Id. at 267.
145. Under Bork's approach, the unprincipled leeway that the courts currently have in either
applying a conclusory label of price fixing or engaging in a tacit rule of reason analysis would be
duplicated in the determination of the restraint's ancillarity.
146. Nor would the primary-ancillary distinction reconcile the per se approach of the single ele-
ment price fixing cases with the well-established use of the rule of reason for evaluating standardiza-
tion programs and exchanges of price information. See supra pp. 723-25.
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B. The Continued Proscription of Cartels
The chief difficulty with the per se price fixing rule is that the courts
have developed no coherent theory of what constitutes price fixing. There
is, however, a well-established theory showing that cartelization-as dis-
tinguished from price fixing-usually creates efficiency losses.1 "
Cartel behavior would, therefore, still be struck down under a rule of
reason approach to price fixing. The judicial inquiry would in fact be the
same as that under the per se approach of the early cases: Once the exis-
tence of a cartel with market power had been established, a holding of
illegality would follow automatically, since the net economic consequences
of a cartel are almost certainly invidious. Thus, there would continue to
be an irrebutable presumption against cartels, but this presumption would
not come into play until after a rule of reason analysis involving market
power, purpose, and probable effects established the existence of a danger-
ous cartel.148 This approach would allow much of the savings in adminis-
trative costs provided by a per se rule to be preserved while avoiding the
invidious effects of the rule as it is currently applied.149
147. See supra p. 711. Under some rare circumstances, cartels may promote efficiency. For exam-
ple, a cartel could be used to insure enhanced point-of-sale services by eliminating the "free rider"
problem. If the sellers of a product agree upon a supracompetitive price, they will have an incentive to
compete by making increased information and services available to customers, since they will not be
undercut by competitors who provide no information or services. Theoretically, the increased services
could raise the marginal costs of the cartel members to the selling price of the product, so that there
would be no supracompetitive profits. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 435. Free rider problems that
could be remedied only by a cartel, however, are probably rare. See R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 22
("few economists believe collusive pricing generates significant economic gains").
148. For an innovative analysis of the determinants of market power, see Landes & Posner, supra
note 31. According to Landes and Posner, the "Lerner index" is the appropriate measure of a firm's
(or group of firms') market power. Id. at 939-40. Because the Lerner index may be derived from an
equation relating a firm's (or group of firms) market share, the market elasticity of demand, and the
elasticity of supply of competing producers, id. at 945, an important claim of the Landes-Posner
analysis is that efficiency losses from any given degree of market power can actually be measured. Id.
at 953-55.
Although the Landes-Posner model provides a theoretical basis for a rule of reason approach to
price fixing, its application to judicial decisionmaking would have to recognize the gap that exists
between the ideal models of price theory and the real world of markets. Most importantly, competitive
markets in the real world may not display prices equal to the marginal costs of each producer. Sellers
may have different costs, and since the competitive price is equal to the marginal cost of the highest-
cost producer, it will be above the marginal costs of the other producers. Second, unanticipated up-
ward shifts in demand will raise competitive prices above marginal costs as a short-term mechanism
for rationing the available supply. See R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 136-37. In general, whenever
demand exceeds supply (as it often may in the real world), prices will be above marginal costs. Under
these circumstances, a per se rule against cartels should not proscribe all agreements that maintain
prices above marginal costs but only those that maintain a difference between price and marginal cost
greater than would exist in the absence of the agreement.
149. Implementation of a rule of reason approach to price fixing could occur either tacitly or
explicitly. In the tacit approach, the courts would refrain from engaging in the conclusory labeling
that has often characterized the per se method. Price fixing agreements would continue to be struck
down if analysis based on the economic structure of the situation revealed invidious purposes or ef-
fects, actual or prospective. In the explicit approach, the Supreme Court would simply overrule
Madison Oil or limit its holding to cartel behavior. The tacit approach would still allow scope for
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Conclusion
The supposed advantages of the per se approach to price fixing no
longer hold up under scrutiny. There is no coherent economic rationale
behind the per se approach, and the erratic and inconsistent application of
the doctrine has not resulted in greater reliability or predictability. There
is some merit to the argument that a per se rule provides greater ease of
judicial administration, but it does so precisely because it arbitrarily pros-
cribes all agreements touching upon price, regardless of their economic
consequences.150 Furthermore, to the extent that a per se approach em-
phasizes proof of price fixing conspiracies instead of anticompetitive pur-
poses or effects, the savings in administrative costs that the rule provides
are significantly reduced by the expensive and extended discovery typical
of conspiracy cases.
A rule of reason approach to price fixing would make judicial analysis
more consistent with economic theory. By expressly recognizing that the
efficiency effects of every price restraint must be evaluated in determining
its legality, it would eliminate the erratic labeling made possible by the
absence of a coherent economic definition of price fixing. A rule of reason
would also make the courts' approach to arrangements such as single ele-
ment price fixing more consistent with their treatment of information ex-
changes and standardization programs. All of these activities may create
efficiencies by reducing information costs in the market, and all deserve a
rule of reason analysis. Finally, a rule of reason will in general promote
more wealth gains than a per se rule because it recognizes the unpredict-
able variety of arrangements that may create efficiencies, even though they
involve some agreement as to price.
inconsistency, since it would signal no clear departure from the courts' current practice of selectively
peeking at the economic merits while ostensibly applying a per se rule. Accordingly, the explicit
approach is more desirable.
150. Warren Schwartz has made a related point with respect to prosecutorial discretion and as-
sessment of damages:
One supposed advantage of per se rules is to increase certainty and reduce process costs by
determining liability through simple descriptive criteria. As a result of this simplification, how-
ever, cases falling within the generalized prohibition vary with respect to the amount of harm
they cause. If these variations are disregarded by the prosecutor in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, or the judge or jury in fixing a penalty or assessing damages, both the intensity of
enforcement and the magnitude of the sanction will be determined inappropriately. If these
variations are taken into account, however, the claimed savings in process costs from a per se
rule seems to be overstated.
Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1089 (1980).
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